Pathways to social inequality by Haynie, H. et al.
Pathways to Social Inequality
Hannah J. Haynie1,2, Patrick H. Kavanagh1, Fiona M. Jordan3, Carol R. Ember4, Russell D. Gray5,
Simon J. Greenhill5,6, Kathryn R. Kirby5,7, Geoff Kushnick8, Bobbi S. Low9, Ty Tuff10,
Bruno Vilela11, Carlos A. Botero12, and Michael C. Gavin1,5
1Department of Human Dimensions of Natural Resources, Colorado State University, Fort Collins,
CO, USA
2Department of Linguistics, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA
3Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom
4Human Relations Area Files, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
5Department of Linguistic and Cultural Evolution, Max Planck Institute for The Science of Human
History, Jena, Germany
6ARC Centre of Excellence for the Dynamics of Language, Australian National University, Can-
berra, ACT, Australia
7Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
8School of Archaeology and Anthropology, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Aus-
tralia
9School of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
10Department of Biology, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
11Institute of Biology, Universidade Federal da Bahia, Salvador, BA, Brazil
12Department of Biology, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA
1
Social inequality is now pervasive in human societies, despite the fact that humans lived in rel-1
atively egalitarian, small-scale societies across most of our history. Prior literature highlights2
the importance of environmental conditions, economic defensibility, and wealth transmission3
for shaping early Holocene origins of social inequality. However, it remains untested whether4
the mechanisms that drive the evolution of inequality in recent human societies follow a sim-5
ilar trajectory. We conduct the first global analysis of pathways to inequality within modern6
human societies using structural equation modeling. Our analytical approach demonstrates7
that environmental conditions, resource intensification, and wealth transmission mechanisms8
impact various forms of social inequality via a complex web of causality. We further find that9
subsistence practices have a direct impact on some institutionalized forms of inequality. This10
work identifies drivers of social inequality in the modern world and demonstrates the appli-11
cation of structural equation modeling methods to investigate complex relationships between12
elements of human culture.13
1 Introduction14
Social and economic inequality are ubiquitous in contemporary human societies, a trend that has15
been linked to a number of detrimental consequences for the environment, the stability of political16
and economic systems, and the well-being of individuals (e.g. 1; 2; 3). This inequality has been17
formalized and reinforced in well-documented societies by cultural institutions like social class18
hierarchies, caste systems, and slavery. However, human social organization is commonly char-19
acterized as having consisted of essentially egalitarian, small-scale societies for the majority of20
human history (4; 5; 6). While both external and intentional leveling mechanisms may have con-21
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tributed to the pervasiveness of egalitarian, small-scale social organization earlier in human history,22
in contrast to the strict social hierarchies common in other primate species (e.g. 7; 8), a different set23
of mechanisms has been proposed to explain the emergence of social inequality and its widespread24
occurrence in modern cultures. Here we investigate institutionalized forms of inequality in mod-25
ern human societies and potential causal relationships with a set of mechanisms that represent a26
possible trajectory for the evolution and maintenance of inequality in recent human history.27
Literature on the evolution of social inequality has focused primarily on reasons for the rise28
of inequality around the dawn of the Holocene (e.g. 5; 6; 9). Somewhat less attention has been29
paid to the processes that have caused this element of human social organization to continue to30
emerge, persist, and evolve in societies during the intervening millennia of human history, or its31
occurrence in a diverse and geographically widespread range of modern human cultures. Our cur-32
rent understanding of the evolution of social inequality does not extend to whether mechanisms33
and pathways associated with the de novo origin of human social inequality might also shape the34
subsequent evolution and persistence of inequality in modern societies. We might expect facets35
of environmental suitability, investment in resources, and wealth transmission patterns to impact36
inequality in recently documented societies, just as they are hypothesized to shape the early evolu-37
tion of inequality (10). We test one potential extension of a generalized pathway for the evolution38
of inequality to the generation and maintenance of three specific types of institutionalized inequal-39
ity in modern societies, using cross-cultural data collected in the Ethnographic Atlas and linked to40
environmental information in the D-PLACE database (11; 12; 13; 14; 15; 16).41
The timing of the earliest evidence of human social inequality has been linked to patterns of42
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climate change, and specifically a decline in climate variability around 12,000 years ago (9; 17; 18).43
This ecological shift is theorized to have made risk mitigation strategies that previously leveled44
social hierarchies less necessary, changing the relationships between humans and natural resources45
in the process (10; 19; 20; 21; 22). Though this sort of global shift in climatic conditions may have46
opened the door to incipient inequality at one specific point in human history, where conditions47
persist that make resources dense or predictable we might expect to find ongoing evidence for48
environmental impacts on the mechanisms that shape inequality. In particular, local environmental49
conditions may play an important role in the intensification of subsistence activities, a cultural shift50
that we expect to have consequences for the distribution and accumulation of wealth, and thus on51
the development of cultural institutions that reinforce inequality.52
Economic defensibility has been ascribed a key role in the emergence of inequality in early53
Holocene small-scale societies. This principle of resource management entails a comparison be-54
tween the costs of defending a resource patch through actions such as monitoring and preventing55
intruders, and the resulting benefits (23). Dense, predictable resources are more defensible, as they56
are associated with relatively small areas to defend, they are easy to locate and monitor, and the57
reliable and abundant resources they produce counter-balance the cost of defense. Behaviours and58
norms that are focused on the defense of natural resources, like territoriality and land ownership,59
are theorized to arise when their benefits outweigh their costs (24). In early Holocene human60
groups, the scales may have tipped toward the adoption of these resource defense strategies when61
increasingly stable environmental conditions led to highly reliable or concentrated resource patches62
(10). Over the subsequent millenia of cultural evolution, human innovations such as cultivation of63
agricultural resources and intensification of production have further enhanced the density and pre-64
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dictability of resources, and thus their defensibility, in some societies (25). Though research on65
early Holocene origins of inequality focuses on defensibility, we note that the sort of extraordi-66
nary global climate shift that led to enhanced defensibility at the dawn of the Holocene has not67
happened since. Thus we hypothesize that the intensification of subsistence resources may play a68
particularly important role in shaping the use, defense, and distribution of resources. Rather than69
simply implementing proxies for a mechanism associated with early Holocene inequality, we pre-70
dict that more intensive production technologies and the associated property ownership will lead to71
unequal accumulation of wealth, and ultimately a greater likelihood of institutionalized inequality.72
Intergenerational transmission of wealth allows unequal distributions of resources in a soci-73
ety to accumulate and persist over time, and is widely believed to play a role in social inequality74
in both ancient and modern societies (e.g. 5; 26; 27). Wealth includes material assets like land and75
tangible property, as well as social wealth (e.g. support networks, power) and embodied wealth76
(e.g. physical health, knowledge) (27; 28). Material wealth is hypothesized to be particularly77
closely linked to inequality (25; 26; 29), especially in agricultural or pastoral societies (25; 27).78
Inheritance of finite resources, like land, whose productivity does not generally increase rapidly79
without major environmental or cultural shifts, may magnify asymmetries in resource distribu-80
tion, and thus may be particularly important to the genesis of inequality (25). Although unequal81
wealth itself in the form of property rights may emerge before agriculture (19), the impacts of82
wealth transmission on social mobility may play an important role in linking subsistence activities83
to institutionalization of inequality.84
Though inequality can be operationalized in a number of ways, we focus on a small set of85
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outcomes that represent rigid and persistent institionalization of inequality. Social stratification in86
general may be characterized by heritable differences in the level of access to resources and power87
enjoyed by members of a society. Some level of social and economic inequality may have existed88
throughout human history merely due to individual variation in economic success and differences89
in the resources controlled by different families or lineages (4). However, the persistent, institu-90
tionalized inequality that is the focus of this study occurs only when differences in resources and91
power become entrenched in a society’s norms and practices to the extent that social status persists92
across generations. We focus on a narrow set of observable institutions which require widespread93
acceptance of persistent social hierarchies, are unequivocally associated with social inequality, and94
can be reliably coded as present or absent across a wide range of societies. We acknowledge that95
inequality takes many forms in human society, and that alternative characterizations of inequality96
(e.g. Gini coefficients) are important for understanding other dimensions of inequality. We propose97
that investigating a limited and cohesive set of variables across a global sample of societies pro-98
vides a perspective not already captured in nation-level economic studies or detailed case studies99
of individual cultures.100
Using this framework, we examine the extent to which empirical evidence supports the hy-101
pothesis that the evolution and maintenance of persistent, institutionalized social inequality in mod-102
ern human societies follows a trajectory that parallels the pathway by which inequality is thought103
to have taken hold earlier in human history. Recent work has described the set of mechanisms104
involved in this pathway as causal links between environmental conditions, resource defensibil-105
ity, wealth transmission, and inequality (10). We propose an analogous trajectory for more recent106
development and maintenance of inequality that focuses not on economic defensibility but on the107
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intensification of subsistence practices and the role these practices play in shaping human use108
of environmental resources and the ownership and transmission of property. This trajectory can109
be schematized as a path model (Fig. 2a). We investigate the details of each of the theoretical110
constructs in this framework using a large, global cross-cultural data sample from the D-PLACE111
database of places, languages, culture, and environment (11), and examine both incremental and112
direct effects of the associated variables on institutionalized inequality by applying a structural113
equation model (SEM) approach.114
In testing whether the factors linked to inequality in modern societies mirror the mechanisms115
proposed to explain the evolution of inequality in early Holocene cultures, this approach employs116
normative data at the society level to test predictions which are often derived from individual-level117
within-population phenomena. To the extent that we expect such phenomena to be detectable in118
population-level patterns, we see cross-cultural tests of behavioural ecology theory as an important119
source of evidence about these predictions (30). By taking advantage of the large global sample of120
society-level data for a complex set of variables, we are able to simultaneously consider multiple121
facets of the generalized pathways and specific associations identified in prior literature (e.g. 10;122
28; 31).123
2 Results124
Our study compares three alternative models, which vary the number of variables and paths in-125
cluded on a standardized structure that reflects the general sequence and directionality of causal126




























































































































Figure 1: Societies included in the study (n=367). Red triangles represent societies that are iden-
tified as having heritable social class systems. Blue dots represent societies with an absence of
heritable social class.
the direction of causality in relationships between variables is assumed to follow a trajectory from128
environmental conditions to resource intensification to wealth transmission, resulting finally in in-129
equality. Across these three models we vary only the inclusion of a population variable and the130
presence of individual pathways. The first alternative (Fig. 2b) restricts the paths in the model to131
a stepwise trajectory that includes only those direct effects that represent sequential links between132
constructs in the aforementioned order, with no additional direct paths (Fig. 2a). The second,133
more elaborate model (Fig. 2c) includes all potential direct effects whose directionality is consis-134
tent with the overall trajectory of the schema, as well as possible effects of population. A third135
model (Fig. 3) preserves well supported paths in Fig. 2c, but eliminates poorly supported paths,136

























































































Figure 2: Path diagrams representing a) generalized trajectory, b) empirical SEM test of
mechanisms on a strictly stepwise trajectory, interpreted through variables derived from D-
PLACE, and c) loose implementation of the hypothesized pathways using variables from
D-PLACE, in which a population size variable and additional direct paths that deviate from
the discrete steps in the schema have been included. Red arrows indicate negative rela-
tionships identified in PiecewiseSEM model. Black arrows represent positive relationships
identified in PiecewiseSEM model. Dashed arrows represent paths not found to be signif-
icant (p <0.05). Significant paths are labeled with standardized coefficients. Individual
variables represented by boxes in the diagram can be interpreted as increasing for con-
tinuous variables and present for categorical variables. See Methods for interpretation of
PCA-derived environmental variables. Model 2c is better supported by the data than 2b
















































Figure 3: Most parsimonious model identified by Piecewise SEM analysis. Black arrows represent
positive relationships. Red arrows represent negative relationships. Dashed arrows represent paths
not found to be significant (p <0.05) Line weights indicate the estimated magnitude of effects,
and paths are labeled with standardized coefficients. Individual variables represented by boxes in
the diagram can be interpreted as increasing for continuous variables and present for categorical
variables. This model is better supported by the data than 2b or 2c (AIC: Model 2b = 185.51,
Model 2c = 162.48, Model 3 = 150.30). n=367.
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Shipley’s test for directional separation indicates that paths are missing from the model that138
implements a strictly stepwise progression of mechanisms on the pathway to inequality (Fig. 2a,139
Fisher’s C=99.51, df=50, p<0.0001) (32). Akaike Information Criterion comparison also suggests140
that the highly restricted path model in Fig. 2b (∆AIC= 35.21, AIC=185.51) does not account for141
the data as well as the more elaborate model in Fig. 2c (∆AIC=12.18, AIC=162.48). The third142
model (Fig. 3) eliminates non-significant paths that are not identified as missing by Shipley’s test143
and reduces unnecessary model complexity (AIC=150.30). AIC comparison suggests that of the144
models under consideration, this final model provides the best characterization of the relationships145
between variables in our dataset.146
The model in Fig. 3 includes both direct and indirect effects of subsistence variables on147
inequality outcomes. Six pairs of variables are linked by both direct and indirect effects, including148
the links from intensive agriculture, large domesticated animals, and real property unigeniture to149
heritable social class that are hypothesized to be particularly important pathways. Table 1 provides150
a comparison between the direct effect and net indirect effect of each predictor on every inequality151
variable.152
We find that the environment has important impacts on the activities that relate to resource in-153
tensification, namely intensive agriculture and keeping large domesticated animals. Environments154
with less seasonal climate variation are more likely to be associated with these two variables, both155
of which represent subsistence activities that may increase resource defensibility. We also find a156
direct link between environmental productivity and slavery, with hereditary slavery more likely to157
occur in more productive environments. Although this relationship is not mediated by the other158
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Table 1: Comparison of the direct and indirect effects in structural equation model in Fig.
3 (standardized coefficients). Net indirect effects are calculated by multiplying coefficients
along each indirect path that connects the predictor and the ultimate response and com-
puting the sum of all indirect paths between predictor and response. For relationships that
are comprised of both direct and indirect effects, bold text indicates the effect of greater
magnitude.
Response Predictor Direct Indirect
Caste Population Size 0.873
Class Intensive Agriculture 1.235 0.077
Class Large Domesticated Animals 0.687 -0.626
Class Movable Property Unigeniture 0.739
Class PC2 -0.640
Class PC1 1.689
Class Real Property Unigeniture 0.693 3.312
Class Hereditary Political Succession 0.605
Class PC3 0.031
Slavery Intensive Agriculture 2.182
Slavery Large Domesticated Animals 0.101
Slavery Heritable Social Class 0.929
Slavery Movable Property Unigeniture 0.687
Slavery PC2 2.120
Slavery PC1 0.457 0.168
Slavery Real Property Unigeniture 0.622 3.720
Slavery Hereditary Political Succession 0.561
Slavery PC3 0.028
Succession Intensive Agriculture -1.308
Succession Large Domesticated Animals -1.035
Succession Movable Property Unigeniture 1.223
Succession PC2 1.296
Succession PC1 0.415 1.189
Succession Real Property Unigeniture 5.478
Succession PC3 -0.521
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cultural variables in our study, it is likely cultural in nature, reflecting the use of slave labor in159
exploiting abundant resources, or potentially a more complex cascade of economic and political160
developments arising from resource surplus. Though the role of environmental conditions in the161
early origins of inequality has been characterized primarily in terms of large-scale patterns in cli-162
mate stability that created better conditions for resource defense in the early Holocene (22), we find163
that climatic predictability and environmental productivity may play complex roles in determining164
strategies for subsistence, shaping social and political processes, and even directly influencing the165
cultural institutions that formalize and reinforce inequality.166
Our results also include strong evidence that wealth transmission norms, and particularly167
those that concentrate power and real property holdings, are associated with the institutionaliza-168
tion of social inequality through class systems in which social status is inherited. The associ-169
ation of both real property unigeniture and hereditary political succession with heritable social170
class supports the hypothesis that many types of wealth contribute to the generation of inequality171
(10; 27; 28). Of the wealth transmission variables included in this analysis, real property uni-172
geniture (transmission of land holdings to a single heir) has the strongest net effect on heritable173
social class. In contrast, movable property unigeniture has no independent direct effects on social174
inequality variables, though it does participate in a relationship with class mediated by political175
succession patterns. These findings support the notion that real property is central to the effect176
material wealth transmission has on inequality, while movable material property inheritance may177
serve primarily to support the accumulation and transmission of social wealth (10; 25; 26; 29).178
We note that unigeniture may be a particularly potent mechanism for concentrating wealth and en-179
couraging formal systems of inequality. We test the same models with intergenerational property180
13
transmission encoded simply as the presence or absence of any inheritance rules for real and mov-181
able property. Because these models result in poorer fit for two of our three inequality variables,182
and because a parsimonious model offers no improvement on the full model with this data, we183
retain unigeniture coding and report the alternative implementation of wealth transmission in the184
supplementary materials.185
We also find a direct effect of real property unigeniture on hereditary slavery. Although the186
magnitude of this effect is smaller than indirect effects of real property inheritance rules on slavery187
through heritable social class, it serves as further evidence of the importance of real property188
inheritance in shaping inequality. The use of slave labor as a means of cultivating large parcels189
of land, which are owned and inherited, explains this relationship to some extent, though it is190
perhaps surprising that we find no evidence that intensive agriculture participates in this pathway191
as a driver of real property unigeniture and an indirect driver of the link between real property192
inheritance patterns and slavery.193
Other components of the most parsimonious model also depart from the expected trajectory.194
The expected stepwise link between resource intensification and wealth transmission occurs in the195
selected model only in the form of an effect of large domesticated animal keeping on hereditary196
political succession, and our model predicts that societies that make use of large domesticated197
animals are, in fact, less likely to have systems of hereditary political succession. If the use of198
large animals is positively linked to the development of inequality, as Kohler et al. have suggested199
for agriculturalists (33) and Smith et al. have proposed for pastoralist societies (25), the negative200
association we find between large animals and transmission of social wealth trends in the opposite201
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direction than we might expect for our sample of modern societies. This result also contrasts with202
prior research that demonstrates positive links between pastoralism, intergenerational of multiple203
types of wealth, and inequality (31).204
Because the data we employ does not distinguish between animals used as a food resource205
and animals used for labor, we report the results of the same modeling task using a dataset that206
excludes societies that obtain a majority of their subsistence through pastoralism. The results207
of this supplementary analysis, which focuses more narrowly on non-pastoral animal husbandry,208
are qualitatively similar to those reported in Fig. 2, suggesting that the surprising direction of209
the relationship between large domesticated animals and inequality is not merely an artifact of210
how animal husbandry has been operationalized. Even in consideration of the limitations of this211
study, such as the narrow focus on a small subset of the manifestations of social inequality, it212
is difficult to interpret this apparent contradiction without further, more detailed examination of213
wealth transmission and inequality in individual pastoralist and agropastoralist societies and in214
targeted cross-cultural samples.215
While intensive subsistence activities might be expected to have primarily indirect impacts216
on social inequality through positive associations with wealth transmission, we find evidence for217
stronger direct impacts of subsistence practices on inequality (see Table 1). Though we know that218
inequality can arise even in the absence of agriculture (4; 10; 25; 29), our results suggest that sub-219
sistence activities themselves are important contributors to the social and economic mechanisms220
out of which rigid inequality structures can arise, independent of wealth transmission patterns221
that consolidate resources and status for the few. This finding implies that inequality in modern222
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societies may arise through multiple pathways, some of which are not dependent on differen-223
tial accumulation of property and power through wealth transmission practices. Specialization224
and division of labor in economies associated with intensive agriculture, for example, might cre-225
ate occupation-based stratification in wealth and prestige, regardless of how property or political226
power are transmitted across generations.227
Our failure to perfectly replicate the sequential progression of mechanisms that are thought to228
have generated early Holocene social inequality might be explainable through alternative, population-229
focused theories (34). We might expect a population-driven explanation to be manifested in a230
trajectory like the one modeled here through effects of population size on wealth transmission or231
institutionalized social inequality. If the links we find between resource intensification and inequal-232
ity are artifacts of demographic pressures or the politics of large scale societies, we would expect233
population size to participate in these pathways. However, we find that population size is linked234
only to caste, and this association is not particularly strong. While this analysis is not designed235
to test any particular demographic pressure model in great detail and lacks the statistical power to236
explore the vast web of cultural, political, and economic pressures at play in its entirety, we find237
no evidence that suggests our results are driven by the scale of the societies involved.238
In addition to testing expectations derived from prior theory, our approach also allows us to239
examine the independent and interrelated effects of individual observable phenomena associated240
with the general constructs of environmental conditions, resource intensification, wealth transmis-241
sion, and institutionalized social inequality. While selecting a parsimonious model of the pathways242
that link our variables, we are simultaneously able to examine the complexities of these pathways.243
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We find, for example, that both real property unigeniture and hereditary political succession are244
significantly positively associated with heritable social class, but not caste, while movable property245
unigeniture has no significant direct impacts on any of our institutionalized inequality variables.246
Furthermore, within the realm of wealth transmission we find evidence that movable property in-247
heritance serves as a link between real property unigeniture and hereditary political succession.248
This creates a strong indirect effect of real property unigeniture on heritable social class and high-249
lights the complexity of interactions within the domain of wealth transmission.250
Our results also point to heritable social class as the measure of institutionalized social in-251
equality that is most strongly associated with the effects of wealth transmission and intensive252
subsistence practices in modern human cultures. Subsistence and wealth transmission variables253
are directly and positively associated with heritable social class, while the direct impact of real254
property unigeniture on slavery is dwarfed by a net indirect effect of real property unigeniture on255
slavery that is mediated by social class. We find no evidence that caste participates in the path-256
ways linking subsistence or economic defensibility and wealth transmission to inequality. Rather,257
caste is predicted only by population size in this model. Although this could potentially be inter-258
preted as support for population-based theories or an impact of population size on the development259
of inequality-reinforcing norms, we propose that this relationship may in fact be an artifact of260
the highly restricted distribution of caste to societies in a small number of language families in261
population-dense regions, namely the Indian subcontinent and parts of Africa. The language fam-262
ily random effect in this model is the best predictor of caste, as evidenced by the marginal model263
fit estimate for this variable (including only fixed effects) of 0.016, and the conditional fit estimate264
(including language family and fixed effects) of 0.963 (See supplementary materials). It may be265
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difficult to systematically identify the drivers responsible for the origin of caste, given that the266
caste systems of the world may reflect a very small number of independent origins and a strong267
signature of shared histories.268
3 Conclusions269
The complex network of effects we identify between environmental, subsistence, inheritance, and270
social inequality variables suggests that how we measure each of the core cultural constructs as-271
sociated with a theoretical evolutionary trajectory for social inequality matters to our ability to272
investigate the processes that create and maintain the institutions that most rigidly support social273
hierarchies. A priori assumptions might have emphasized intensive agriculture as a means of in-274
creasing economic defensibility, and thus a likely predictor of real property inheritance patterns275
and inequality in turn (35), which could have been tested in a simpler model. However, the inclu-276
sion of several variables to represent each component of the theory enables us to identify pathways277
that deviate from expected trajectories in addition to those that support prior hypotheses.278
Our ability to measure the relevant characteristics of societies is limited in practice by the279
availability of cross-cultural data. With the data used in this analysis we may not be able to capture280
all of the complexity in the phenomena discussed in great detail in a large body of prior literature,281
or to capture additional phenomena that may contribute to the modern evolution of inequality. The282
results presented here do not, in other words, rule out other possible pathways. Many causal rela-283
tionships have been proposed that may impact individual cultural traits and mediate relationships284
within this set of variables. For example, though our results do not support the potential importance285
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of real property inheritance as a link from agriculture to social inequality, such a pathway might286
be detectable if specific other variables were included in the analysis. One proposal suggests that287
metallurgy might arise in agricultural societies and subsequently have an effect on social inequality288
(36).289
There are also numerous other theories about the evolution of slavery (e.g. 37; 38). Due290
to limitations of data availability we are unable to address every possibility outlined in prior re-291
search, and instead focus on whether the influences on contemporary inequality mirror the set of292
mechanisms for generating inequality that are supported by a large body of literature and distilled293
in a recent review of that work (10). Because this approach focuses on a specific set of general,294
society-level phenomena, we urge caution in interpreting results of this type of analysis; our model295
helps us understand influences on cultural evolution but does not represent a singular, inevitable296
trajectory for the evolution of institutions of social inequality. Other facets of human culture and297
behavior are of vital importance in understanding individual systems of slavery, caste, and social298
class.299
Though no analysis can address all hypotheses in light of current data constraints, the re-300
sults we present here answer several questions and illuminate others that are deserving of further301
research. For example, the absence of an expected path from intensive agriculture to real property302
inheritance patterns defies a strong prior expectation and points out a need for further research on303
the relationship between agricultural practices, land tenure and real property inheritance.304
The methods we implement here represent a novel but rigorous way to explore the complex305
relationships between cultural phenomena that may interact both directly and indirectly, while also306
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controlling for shared histories. The structural equation approach illustrated in this analysis makes307
it possible to examine in detail the empirical evidence for bold theories that have been proposed to308
explain the evolution of human culture.309
4 Methods310
This study employs Ethnographic Atlas and environmental data for 367 societies available in the311
D-PLACE database (11; 12; 13; 14; 15; 16) that are referenced to both specific times and places.312
This sample of 367 societies is the maximal sample size for which all of the variables included in313
our study were available. While this sample is distributed around the globe, no special effort was314
made to control for cultural relatedness through sampling (as in, for example, the Standard Cross-315
Cultural Sample). Instead, we control for genealogical relationships explicitly in the design of our316
mixed effects path models. Although the current lack of a reliable, global cultural phylogeny pre-317
vents us from using phylogenetic methods to control for shared histories, we use a random effect of318
language family in the SEM framework to control for well-established genealogical relationships319
between societies.320
The variables in the study serve as proxies for the more abstract constructs that are central321
to the hypothesized sequential evolution of early Holocene social inequality, and represent these322
societies as they were observed at a single point during or near the early 20th century. These data323
largely result from coding of ethnographic sources, which limits to some extent the ways in which324
we can test evolutionary hypotheses. For example, the variables selected for this study reflect325
not only a translation of central theoretical constructs to observable society-level phenomena, but326
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also the availability of data describing those phenomena in a large sample of societies around the327
world. While the data and model we use do not explicitly reconstruct historical states of cultures328
and their changes over time, the relationships we identify in this empirical data enable inferences329
about the processes involved in the rise and maintenance of institutionalized social inequality in330
modern human cultures.331
We represent environmental conditions using three variables derived from a principal com-332
ponents analysis (PCA). Although work on early Holocene inequality has characterized the envi-333
ronment largely in terms of temporal trends toward stability immediately prior to that time, the334
environmental variables included in this analysis allow us to characterize the productivity and335
predictability of local environments, which are likely to impact the spatial variation we find in336
human economic activity and cultural norms across a relatively narrow slice of history. Raw data337
used in this study describe the mean, variance, and predictability of temperature, precipitation,338
and net primary productivity (NPP) at each location, as well as measures of elevation and slope339
(see supplementary information). Because this set of environmental variables is known to to be340
highly correlated, we reduced it to three composite variables through principal components anal-341
ysis (PCA) to avoid multicollinearity in the downstream SEM analyses (see Table S2). Higher342
values of PC1 and lower values of PC2 may be expected in productive environments with pre-343
dictable climates, conditions which may enhance economic defensibility. Higher values of PC3344
are associated with topographic complexity, which can increase the patchiness of resources and345
may thus also contribute to some extent to defensibility.346
Domestication of plants and animals has been described as insufficient to spur the develop-347
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ment of inequality (25), and evidence for inequality that predates agriculture suggests that it is also348
not a necessary condition for the emergence of inequality (4; 29). Yet empirical work has found349
evidence that agriculture – particularly intensive agriculture – and the keeping of large domesti-350
cated animals is associated with the wealth distribution and transmission practices that shape social351
hierarchies (27; 28; 33; 39).352
The observed link between subsistence and inequality has been explained as an association353
between intensive agriculture and property rights, and a resulting concentration of material wealth354
and political power in agricultural societies (e.g. 19; 25; 28; 39; 40). The presence of large domes-355
ticated animals represents a similar pattern that has been identified for pastoralist societies (31),356
and also an association between plow agriculture, the maintenance of draught animals, and dif-357
ferential distribution of material wealth (33). We include both the presence of large domesticated358
animals and the presence of intensive agriculture in our study to represent subsistence activities that359
have been linked to inequality in prior empirical studies and are likely to impact the economics of360
resource defense.361
We focus on resource intensification as a technological and economic link between environ-362
mental conditions and wealth accumulation. While prior research has portrayed this link more363
broadly as a function of economic defensibility, targeting this mechanism allows this analysis to364
ask a specific question about the human activities that may have resulted in institutionalized in-365
equality in modern human societies.366
Our analysis represents wealth transmission primarily as it relates to material and social367
wealth. Material wealth transmission is characterized for the purposes of this study by variables368
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representing the presence or absence of inheritance rules that bequeath real property (land) and369
movable property, respectively, to a single heir (unigeniture). Social wealth transmission is charac-370
terized here by the presence or absence of hereditary political succession. Although we recognize371
the importance of embodied wealth in shaping cultures, data limitations prevent us from exploring372
that component of wealth transmission in this analysis.373
Real property has been ascribed a particularly prominent role in differential wealth distribu-374
tion due to practical limits on its subdivision and productivity (25; 26; 41). Movable property is375
considered to be relatively indefensible by Mattison et al. (10), however possession and inheri-376
tance of animals has been linked to inequality (31; 33). We include both real and movable property377
to investigate the roles of each in the generation of institutionalized inequality. We hypothesize378
that these two types of wealth may interact in different ways with intensive agriculture and with379
the keeping of large animals. Our characterization of material property inheritance in terms of380
unigeniture reflects an expectation that an inherently unequal pattern of wealth transmission across381
generations is particularly likely to concentrate resources and power and thus lead to institution-382
alized inequality. In using a variable that describes hereditary political succession to represent383
social wealth inheritance, we consider political power to be a reflection of social influence, and its384
hereditary assignment to be a manifestation of the intergenerational transmission of social wealth.385
Persistent, institutionalized inequality, defined clearly by Mattison et al. (10), includes a386
number of structures of varying levels of formality that emerge in societies to create and maintain387
stratification. While inequality exists in many forms, at many scales, in many parts of society, it388
is characterized in this study by the presence or absence of three forms of institutionalized social389
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hierarchy that are well described by cross-cultural data: class, caste, and slavery. Each of these390
variables is encoded in a separate binary (presence/absence) variable, so that relationships between391
individual types of wealth transmission and specific inequality outcomes may be investigated. For392
each of these variables, we restrict the presence category to instances where the social stratifica-393
tion system may persist across generations, namely heritable social class, hereditary slavery, and394
caste. These response variables represent a small subset of the outcomes that can be considered395
to exemplify persistent, institutionalized, inequality. However, they have the advantages of being396
reliably identifiable as persistent and institutionalized forms of inequality, of being recoverable for397
a maximally large, globally distributed sample of societies, and of representing particularly rigid398
and entrenched mechanisms for enforcing social hierarchies.399
Our coding of slavery is complicated by a large number of societies which are coded as400
“slavery reported but not identified as hereditary or nonhereditary” in the Ethnographic Atlas. We401
have included these societies in the “hereditary slavery absent” category in the analysis presented402
here. Results using the alternative binarization (with these societies coded as “hereditary slavery403
present”) differ from the results presented above in having a significant direct effect of intensive404
agriculture on slavery but no direct effects of PC1 or real property unigeniture on this outcome.405
Full results of the analysis including the alternative binarization of the slavery variable are reported406
in the supplementary materials.407
Not all approaches to the evolution of inequality focus on resources, their defense, and the408
transmission of the resulting wealth. One competing family of theories ascribes the rise of inequal-409
ity to pressures associated with growing populations and the organization of large-scale societies410
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(18; 34; 42; 43; 44). Examining the complexities of theories that center on carrying capacity, popu-411
lation pressure, and the roles of individual-level competition and cooperation in creating inequality412
in detail is beyond the scope of the current analysis of group-level phenomena. However, we are413
able to incorporate population size into our model and test whether this measure of society size414
is a significant driver of inequality, as might be predicted by this set of theories. Johnson’s scalar415
stress theory (34), for example, associates hierarchical organization, including social status hier-416
archies, with the organizational pressures present in larger population. Under such a theory we417
might expect population size to mediate impacts of agriculture or to serve as an independent driver418
of inequality. Population size may also impact economic defensibility in complex ways through419
its effects on within-group coordination and between-group competition (24). Incorporating pop-420
ulation size in the model and assessing both its direct and indirect effects on inequality allows us421
to examine whether resources and population work independently or in concert to impact wealth422
and social hierarchy, and whether one or the other of these is a more important driver of institu-423
tionalized inequality. This variable is encoded as a continuous variable that estimates the number424
of individuals in each entire ethnic group. More information about the coding of all variables can425
be found in the supplementary information.426
We analyzed the data described above for 367 societies in the R statistical computing envi-427
ronment, using the packages PiecewiseSEM and lme4 for structural equation modeling (45; 46).428
Language family was included as a random effect to control for potential non-independence of data429
that may result from common cultural inheritance, following Botero et al. (47). Because no widely430
accepted global phylogeny of languages or cultures currently exists, we are unable to implement431
phylogenetic path models, and instead use a less complex but more widely accepted method of432
25
controlling for historical relationships through the inclusion of well established language family433
classifications as a random effect in a mixed model framework (48; 49)434
An initial model presents a very simple implementation of a stepwise pathway to inequality,435
modeled to parallel the trajectory for early Holocene inequality origins outlined by Mattison et436
al. (10) (Fig. 2b). In this model, environmental conditions are represented by our derived PC437
variables. These have direct effects only on subsistence (large domesticated animals and intensive438
agriculture). Subsistence variables represent modern use of resources and technologies to intensify439
subsistence, and these variables in turn have direct effects only on wealth transmission variables.440
The three wealth transmission variables have direct effects only on the three social inequality441
variables. Any relationship between environmental or subsistence variables and inequality can442
be characterized in this model only by an indirect path through one or more wealth transmission443
variables.444
We may not expect the chain of causal links modeled as a simplistic set of sequential effects445
in Fig. 2b to serve as the only pathway for inequality to arise, exclusive of any direct impacts446
of the environment or defensibility-enhancing subsistence practices on inequality. Prior literature447
presents a more complex picture than the strictly stepwise schema is able to capture, and the448
trajectory outlined in Fig. 2a does not explicitly rule out additional, direct links. For this reason449
we also consider a more elaborate model that adheres to the same assumptions about directionality450
and ordering of causal links, but includes a more complete set of direct paths between variables.451
In this second model (Fig. 2c), the directionality of all estimated paths moves from envi-452
ronment to subsistence/population, then inheritance, and finally inequality. Additional paths were453
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added to the set in Fig. 2b to allow for the possibility of direct effects of predictors on variables454
farther to the right in the diagram. These direct paths extend from environmental variables to inher-455
itance and social inequality variables, reflecting the possibility that the environment impacts wealth456
transmission and institutions of inequality independently of agricultural practices and/or popula-457
tion size. Direct paths from agricultural variables and population to social inequality variables are458
also included. In this model population is treated as an additional potential predictor of wealth459
transmission and inequality variables, reflecting hypotheses that link inequality to demographic460
factors and the possibility that resource intensification and society scale have non-independent461
impacts on inequality outcomes.462
Finally, we use the support for individual paths in the full model (Fig. 2c) to develop a463
more parsimonious model that retains well supported pathways but eliminates unnecessary model464
complexity (Fig. 3).465
5 Data Availability466
All data are available online at https://d-place.org/. See supplementary materials for detailed infor-467
mation on variables and societies included in this study.468
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